Qatar

Qatar has participated in two UN peacekeeping operations with voluntary contributions. First, Qatar participated in UNFICYP with $21,000 (UNDPI 1996, 708). And second, in UNPF (BiH) with an unspecified voluntary contribution (Ibid., 749). Qatar’s main reason for not contributing to UN peace operations rests on the internal policy focused on strengthening its economic success. As a result, Qatar, a former pearl-fishing centre and once one of the poorest Gulf states, is now one of the richest countries in the region, thanks to the exploitation of large oil and gas fields since the 1940s (BBC 2006au, par.1). Also, the Qatari armed forces are relatively small, and would thus be unable to protect the country against a serious attack by a regional power (EIU 2006ak, 14).

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.

Perception of peacekeeping
No record.

Domestic political environment
The Al Thani family has governed efficiently, if autocratically, since independence from the UK in 1971, devoting considerable resources to major social and infrastructure improvements (Ibid., 9). The current emir, Sheikh Hamad, is the country’s most important political figure, as he was for many years before taking power in 1995 (Ibid.). There is no record about former debates on sending troops to UN peace operations.

Domestic economic environment
Qatari economic growth has accelerated impressively in recent years, largely because of sustained high oil prices (Ibid., 21). Despite diversification efforts, the economy remains heavily dependent on oil (although it is increasingly becoming a major gas producer) (Ibid.).

Military affairs
The Qatari armed forces are relatively small, and would thus be unable to protect the country against a serious attack by a regional power (Ibid., 14).

In addition, only 30% of the army is of Qatari nationality, with the remainder consisting of paid expatriate soldiers. As a member of the GCC, Qatar benefits from that group’s regional security arrangements, but the actual combined forces remain small in number. Qatar’s external security is consequently guaranteed by the US, the UK and France, which also supply most of its military equipment. Qatar has a bilateral security arrangement with the US. Details of this agreement have not been published, but the extensive use the US made of Qatari facilities in the Iraq war suggests that it allows for unfettered access to Qatari bases and full rights to preposition military equipment. (Ibid.)

Terrorism is also a concern in Qatar. With the country's territorial integrity secure, Qatar has been seeking to realign its armed forces in order to make them better prepared to deal with the extremist Islamist threat, particularly following the bombing in Doha in March 2005 (Ibid.).

For this effect, Qatar has needed assistance. Thus, with Western assistance, parallel security establishments—the State Security Agency and Internal Security Force—have been set up, reporting directly to the emir (Ibid., 15). Equipment less relevant to this drive has been discarded, although a reported deal to sell 12 French-built Mirage jets to India has yet to materialize (Ibid.).

Foreign policy
Qatar’s diplomatic relations have undergone a sea-change in recent years (Ibid., 11). Long regarded as an inward looking country, Qatar began to pursue an independent foreign policy in the early years of Sheikh Hamad’s rule (Ibid.). Nevertheless, Qatar did not worry about its perception among the Gulf monarchies. Thus, the most dramatic instance of this was the decision to allow the US to make use of bases in Qatar for the central command and control of the Iraq war in the spring of 2003 (Ibid., 12).

Although ties with Saudi Arabia have improved since Sheikh Khalifa’s planned counter-coup in 1996 (which Saudi Arabia, as well as Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, allegedly supported), relations are still relatively frosty (Ibid.).

A plan to build a causeway linking Qatar and the UAE has been blocked by Saudi Arabia, which objected on the grounds that the proposed bridge runs through Saudi waters and that the two countries allegedly failed to notify it of the scheme. Ties with Oman have always been close, and those with Kuwait are solid. Relations with neighboring Bahrain have continued to improve, following the settlement of the long-running dispute over the Hawar islands. Relations with Israel are tentative. (Ibid., 12-13)

Qatar’s independent foreign policy has at times caused severe diplomatic tensions, particularly with regard to its policy of allowing a range of international dissidents to seek refuge on its shores (Ibid., 14). As an example, “relations with Russia [had been] damaged by Chechen leader’s killing” (Ibid.). Qatar is keen on effectively participating in all issues and challenges that confront the gulf region (MOFA 2006, par. 1). It further attaches great importance to supporting the march of the GCC (Ibid.).

Qatar also exerts strenuous efforts to help achieve Arab solidarity and build channels of confidence and communication among Arab States. Qatar also underlines the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. At the international arena, Qatar supports the United Nations efforts and acts to exchange relations with all the peace-loving states and peoples. (Ibid., par. 2)

Qatar's international relations will continue to centre on its close ties with the US, which allow it to pursue a foreign policy mostly independent of its larger neighbours (EIU 2006ch, 1).

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.